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LAW, LANGUAGE, AND POLITICS 
Jody Armour
ABSTRACT 
This Article celebrates the creative role of language in producing profound social change.  It therefore argues for 
great circumspection in regulations of hate speech that may be used to limit socially oppressed groups’ access to the 
words and symbols they view as most forceful and effective in political communication.  Although many thoughtful 
racial-justice advocates support hate speech codes in the interest of racial equality, the Author worries that such 
regulation can actually hinder the fight for racial equality by being turned against members of marginalized groups 
who seek to deploy disruptive language in their discourse of resistance and struggle for equality.  To explore these 
issues, the Article discusses current social contests over the meaning of the Confederate Flag and the N-word, two 
forms of symbolic communication often associated with hateful thoughts and deeds.  It examines whether their 
hateful histories are baked into the meaning of each, so that any use of either constitutes hate speech, or if their 
meanings are mutable and contestable.  The Article links these questions to ones about the mutability and 
contestability of the words that make up the legal lexicon, many of which have also been associated with rank 
racial discrimination.  Drawing on Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, and George Lakoff, it outlines a social theory of 
meaning that affirms the radical agency of the legal lexicon—and indeed of all language—and counsels against 
blanket prohibitions on disruptive or transgressive forms of symbolic communication.  It argues that the language 
of lawyers and laypersons alike lack fixed and frozen meanings and, therefore, even the vilest forms of symbolic 
communication can be put to novel, or even revolutionary, legal, political, and artistic uses.   
 
  Roy P. Crocker Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law School. A.B. Harvard 
University; J.D. University of California at Berkeley. I dedicate this article about the emancipatory 
power of word work to the memory of my father, Fred Armour, Sr. (Armour v. Salisbury, 492 F.2d 
1032 (6th Cir. 1974)), a triumphant jailhouse lawyer who mastered the legal lexicon and then made 
his frozen circumstances dance by playing to them their own melody.  I am also grateful to Volume 
22 of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law for their editorial assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Language . . . [is] an act with consequences. 
—Toni Morrison1
Although the Tinker case arose from student activism on campus and 
addressed the limits of student expression, its importance in today’s society 
extends also to the limits of open expression at public and private universities 
for students, faculty, and invited speakers.  Symposium panelists discussed 
the impact of controversial speakers such as Milo Yiannopoulos and Richard 
Spencer, or Ben Shapiro and Ann Coulter, and many of the universities who 
have refused to allow certain guest speakers onto their campuses.  Most of 
these controversial speakers have been characterized by their critics as 
conservative, right-leaning, right-wing, or reactionary firebrands who traffic 
in “hate speech.”  Some panelists pointed out that many students may not 
realize that “hate speech” is a protected form of speech.  They further argued 
that the difference between an insensitive or offensive statement, a threat, 
and a hate crime is often overlooked. 
Although, as a Critical Race Theory scholar, I have never been referred 
to as conservative or right-leaning, I have been accused of trafficking in “hate 
speech.”  The reason: for many years I have deployed “the N-word” in law 
review articles, speeches, lectures, presentations, documentaries, and social 
media.  In fact, like Yiannopoulos, Spence, Shapiro, and Coulter, students 
and activists who deemed my use of the blood-stained epithet offensive, 
hateful, and even violent have vociferously denounced me and sought to have 
some of my presentations canceled. 
The claim that any form of linguistic or nonlinguistic symbolic 
communication is inherently or irredeemably hateful or racist—a claim at 
the heart of many campus hate speech codes—resonates with important and 
longstanding debates about the nature of the legal lexicon.  For word work is 
the bread and butter of lawyers and the beating heart of the law.  But a 
question that my law students often pose to me, and that I at one time kept 
asking myself, is whether the heart of mainstream legal discourse is still 
beating in the sense of being an agent of social change, or, as some legal 
scholars contend,2 whether the legal lexicon is so full of words with fixed and 
 
 1 Toni Morrison, Nobel Lecture (Dec. 7, 1993). 
 2 Cf. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 20–21 (1988) 
(explaining the implicit sexism of the “reasonable person” standard).  
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frozen meanings that its heart is at least languishing, or perhaps not beating 
at all.  This question can be put more broadly: can any word or symbol in law 
and everyday public discourse be used to produce change, or instead do 
many carry fixed meanings that can only promote and protect entrenched 
power and the status quo?  The beating heart of language is its agency, its 
ability to bring about change, but words and symbols with fixed meanings 
remain prisoners of their past and lack the agency to mint new meanings and 
midwife new worlds. 
  Two current debates—one over the meaning of the Confederate battle 
flag ignited by the Emanuel Nine murders, the other over the meaning of the 
N-word in popular culture and public discourse—chime with and shed light 
on this debate about fixed meanings in legal discourse.  Some battle flag and 
N-word opponents contend that both forms of symbolic communication 
must be banned from public discourse as forms of hate speech because they 
carry certain indelible meanings, just as some legal scholars contend that 
legal discourse carries certain indelible meanings.  But if words, symbols, and 
discourses carry fixed meanings, then any attempt to produce change 
through them is fraught with the danger of reproducing old, outmoded, and 
oppressive worldviews and ways of thinking.  This is the NAACP’s position 
on the N-word,3 and it is the attitude of some legal scholars and law students 
toward the legal lexicon.   
Viewing words and symbols as mere reflections of “ideas” in people’s 
heads leads some to regard them as mere tokens of “consciousness” that 
belong to the realm of “ideology.”  This view relegates language to a minor 
role in social action, namely, to the role of a passive conduit through which 
creative energies flow but which is not itself a source of creative social change 
any more than a typewriter or word processor is a source of creative 
narratives in fiction writing.  But whereas a typewriter cannot create a plot 
twist in an unfolding drama, a choice word can.4 
 
 3 See infra Part I.  
 4 “These are the times that try men’s souls,” begins Thomas Paine’s first Crisis paper, part of a searing 
pamphlet series that helped spark the American Revolution.  THOMAS PAINE, The Crisis, in 1 
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 75, 75 (George H. Evans ed., 1839).  Although the flame 
of revolutionary resistance was already alive when Paine’s pamphlets hit the streets of Philadelphia 
in 1776, many historians contend that his work “unified dissenting voices and persuaded patriots 
that the American Revolution was not only necessary, but an epochal step in world history.”  Book 
Common Sense (Paperback), BLUE WILLOW BOOKSHOP, https://www.bluewillowbookshop.com/
book/9781434101655 (last visited June 3, 2020).  John Adams said: “Without the pen of [Paine], 
 
June 2020] LAW, LANGUAGE, AND POLITICS 1077 
   
 
This Article draws on Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, and George Lakoff to 
outline a social theory of meaning that affirms the radical agency of language, 
which creates us at the very moment it is being created.  We make history by 
making, contesting, and transforming the meaning of words and symbols.  
Meanings are not fixed; they are prizes in a pitched battle among social 
actors seeking to establish and maintain their social identities and promote 
their social interests.  People form and transform communities and establish 
individual and social identities through social struggles over the meaning of 
words and symbols.  A language with fixed and frozen meanings lacks the 
agency to generate new worlds.  The heart of such language is no longer 
beating.  But this Article will show that the language of lawyers and 
laypersons alike lacks fixed meanings and therefore its heart will keep beating 
as long as individuals continue to form social identities and advance social 
movements by contesting the meaning of words and symbols.  Even the vilest 
forms of symbolic communication commonly called “hate speech” lack fixed 
meanings and hence can be put to novel legal, political, and artistic uses. 
I. THE NAACP N-WORD EULOGY 
During its 2007 annual convention, the NAACP sought to purge popular 
culture and public discourse of the N-word by holding a public burial for it 
in Detroit, Michigan, on Freedom Plaza.  The ceremony included a march 
by delegates from across the country through downtown Detroit, led by two 
Percheron horses pulling a pine box adorned with fake black roses and 
bearing the remains of the racial slur.  NAACP National Board Chairman 
Julian Bond, Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick, and the young delegates who 
organized the funeral were cheered by hundreds of onlookers.  “We gather 
burying all the things that go with the N-word.  We have to bury the ‘pimps’ 
and the ‘hos’ that go with it,” said Mayor Kirkpatrick.  The Rev. Otis Moss 
III, assistant pastor at Trinity United Church of Christ in Chicago, said in 
his eulogy of the word, “[t]his was the greatest child that racism ever 
birthed.”5  The following official Obituary for the N-Word, written by 
Victoria Lanier, Erica McLaughlin, and Arielle Palmer, was read aloud at 
 
the sword of Washington would have been raised in vain.”  Jill Lepore, The Sharpened Quill, NEW 
YORKER (Oct. 9, 2006), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/10/16/the-sharpened-
quill.  
 5 NAACP Delegates ‘Bury’ N-Word in Ceremony, NBC NEWS (July 9, 2007, 7:28 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/19680493/ns/us_news-life/t/naacp-delegates-bury-n-word-cerem
ony/#.Xh3flkdKiUk.   
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the funeral in Freedom Plaza on July 9, 2007 and usefully illustrates the fixed 
meaning approach to language frequently adopted by those who reject all 
uses of any form of the N-word:  
Born in America over 400 years ago, birthed to the unlikely couple 
Language and Hate, Nigger entered society to carry out his odium of black-
skinned people.  Christened by colonial settlers, Nigger packed his bags to 
find a comfortable, permanent home in America’s Deep South.  Although 
still in his early years, Nigger obtained widespread success in portraying 
ignorance, incompetence, and buffoonery as a direct relation to having dark 
skin.  Nigger redefined what it meant to be black.  A nigger could act and 
sing, but could not speak properly or effectively.  He could smoke and dance 
but he could not read and be educated.  Nigger developed a whole line of 
products to market to those who practice in the profession of racial hatred.  
He coined the following terms: Niggerlover—one who was sensitive in any 
way to blacks, Niggerlipping—to wet the end of a cigarette while smoking, 
Nigger Milk—as advertised in a 1916 advertisement which showed a black 
baby drinking from a bottle of ink.  Nigger produced these and countless 
other inventions which proved favorable among those who wished to 
maintain their supremacy by demeaning blacks in America. 
Finally, a group of intelligent and outspoken dark-skinned brothers and 
sisters decided to rebel against Nigger’s dominance.  As they formed the Civil 
Rights Movement, they fought against Nigger and his army of white 
supporters to reform society.  Although he was almost killed during this time 
period, Nigger survived.  Realizing it was inappropriate to blatantly continue 
his past message of white supremacy, “Nigger” changed his name to “Nigga” 
and assumed a new persona.  Nigga, now disguised as an ally to black youth, 
could go undercover and position himself as a “link” to black unity.  In the 
1980s, Nigga was introduced to some new powerful partners with the rise of 
HipHop, and he gained popularity in the media, among comedians, rappers 
and other entertainers convincing black people that despite his hateful roots, 
to be the “Nigga” was to be “down for the cause”, to be “cool” and was 
about ‘keeping it real”.  “Nigga” made it hard for young NAACP activists to 
fight the battle for freedom while remaining a part of the hip hop generation. 
  Although now in disguise, “Nigga” was recognized by those who 
remember his menacing consumption of the souls of their people.  Nigga 
began to separate black youth from their proud history, and successfully 
encouraged youth of other races to join his campaign for [its] resurgence in 
demeaning the African-American race.  Nigger sought to secure his place 
forever becoming synonymous with black people, even in the dictionary.  
The NAACP was triumphant in prevailing over Nigger’s attempt to define 
himself as Nigger—a black person.  However, Miriam [sic] Webster’s 
Dictionary today says that the word’s usage among blacks is quote “not 
always intended or taken as offensive”, and Dictionary.com says that Nigger 
is “sometimes used among African-Americans in a neutral or familiar way.”  
Young black people claimed “Nigga” as their own, while many proud racists, 
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once responsible for the word’s popularity, and who are now banned from 
usage of the word, revel in the resurrection of their beloved friend. 
  Today, we will lay the word nigger to rest.  We will no longer make 
“nigger” familiar or a part of our family.  We will bury its offensive usage 
among people of all races, including African Americans.  We will bury 
“nigger” next to his cousins, “jigaboo”, “coon”, “darkie”, “pickanniny”, 
“savage”, “sambo”, “mammy”, “buckwheat”, “boy” and “nappy headed 
ho”.  We promise to be more creative in our rap lyrics, more respectful to 
our ancestors, more diligent in our fight for freedom.  As we bury the word 
nigger, we are inspired by 2nd Corinthians chapter 4 which says: We are 
troubled on every side, yet not distressed; we are perplexed, but not in 
despair; Persecuted, but not forsaken; cast down, but not destroyed; 
Therefore, we do not lose heart, though outwardly we are wasting away, 
inwardly we are being renewed day by day.  Nigger has terrorized us, but he 
has not beaten us, we have overcome him and we celebrate the end of his 
existence in our community.  We officially declare him DEAD!  We will not 
revive, resurrect, or recover him!  We will rebuke, resist, and revoke him in 
the name of pride and progress.   
Ashes to Ashes Dust to Dust If God won’t have him The Devil Must.6  
This is an eloquent send-off, but it turns out reports of the N-word’s 
demise were premature.  Countless times a day it rises like Lazarus to walk 
among us in popular culture, public discourse, and casual banter.  
Historically, both the battle flag and the racial epithet have been used to 
express anti-black beliefs and attitudes, but only the N-word has been widely 
appropriated by black artists such as The Last Poets, NWA, Ice Cube, Saul 
Williams, Tupac Shakur, dead prez, Nas, Jay Z, and Kendrick Lamar to also 
signal sympathy and political solidarity with other blacks (no critical mass of 
black artists have similarly inverted the historical meaning of the Confederate 
battle flag and used it to bond with other blacks).  Inspired by these masters 
of N-word-laden oppositional discourse, I, too, have featured the N-word in 
my own Critical Race Theory work.7   
But N-word abolitionists like the NAACP reject N-word-laden 
commentaries by performers and law professors on the “common sense” 
ground that the N-word has fixed or “inherent meaning.”  For them, a 
racially oppressive “ideology” or “consciousness” or “mentality” 
 
 6 Victoria Lanier, Erica McLaughlin & Arielle Palmer, Obituary for the N-Word, SOJOURNER’S 
TRUTH, Oct. 31, 2007, at 15 (transcribing a speech read aloud at the funeral in Detroit’s Freedom 
Plaza), available at https://www.thetruthtoledo.com/pdf/2007/103107pdf.pdf. 
 7 Jody Armour, Nigga Theory: Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity in the Substantive Criminal Law, 12 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 9, 9–10 (2014).  
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accompanies all its utterances.  These lingual fundamentalists start with the 
undeniable premise that the N-word has virulently racist roots and draw the 
mistaken conclusion that all current uses and applications are tainted fruit of 
a poisonous etymological tree.8 
II. PHILOSOPHICAL AND FOLK MODELS SUPPORT NAACP’S FIXED 
MEANING APPROACH 
Studies show that ordinary people without any technical expertise have 
theories—called folk theories or folk models9—about everything important to 
them, from how the physical world works10 to “how we use words to refer to 
things in the world.”11  A “folk theory,” as George Lakoff points out, “defines 
common sense itself”;12 in his words, “we are all folk philosophers of language 
in that we have folk theories of reference.”13  Paul Kay has shown that 
ordinary speakers of English hold the following folk theory of how we use 
words to refer to things: “words can fit the world by virtue of their inherent 
meaning.”14  Put differently, it is common sense to think that words have 
“inherent meanings”—that is, meanings that competent speakers of a 
language know and make use of15—and that words refer to things and kinds 
of things by way of those meanings.16  The word duck, for instance, correctly 
refers to the kind of creature in the world that corresponds to the word’s 
established “inherent meaning,” namely, a bird with a broad, flat bill, short 
 
 8 From the perspective of lingual fundamentalists, a speaker or writer does not merely utter the N-
word, he or she is uttered by it, for the word’s inherent meaning colors the consciousness of all who 
use it.  See Press Release, NAACP, NAACP Statement on Use of ‘N-Word’ at White House 
Correspondents’ Dinner (May 3, 2016), https://www.naacp.org/latest/naacp-statement-use-n-
word-white-house-correspondents-dinner/.  
 9 GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL 
ABOUT THE MIND 118 (1987).  
 10 Id. at 121–22 (citation omitted).  
 11 Id. at 122. 
 12 Id. at 121. 
 13 Id. at 122. 
 14 Id.  
 15 Id. at 168. 
 16 Id. at 172 (“Our definitional knowledge of words corresponds to the essential properties of the entities 
and categories that the words designate.”). 
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legs, and webbed feet.17  All members of the category designated by the word 
“duck” share those characteristics. 
This folk model of meaning neatly fits the NAACP’s N-word eulogy.  For 
N-word eulogists, its inherent meaning derives from its historical use as a 
racial slur against blacks.  Because of its history, the word inherently means 
an odious and contemptible black person in the eyes of whites, and includes 
in its “definition” blacks who are ignorant, incompetent, and given to 
buffoonery by virtue of their black skin.18  For convenience, let’s say that the 
word simply means “Odious Black.”  If the N-word’s inherent meaning then 
is “Odious Black,” under our folk theory of reference, the word only correctly 
refers to persons in the world of that kind, to persons who belong to that 
category, who correspond to that meaning, who satisfy that definition—to 
persons whose properties include being odious and black.  The N-word 
cannot correctly be used to refer to, say, “black friends and neighbors and loved 
ones” because such persons, as objects of care and concern rather than 
odium and contempt, do not correspond to the inherent or true meaning of 
the word; they lack a property essential for membership in the N-word 
category.  Accordingly, any effort by artists, academics, or activists to extend 
the range of application of the N-word to include “black friends and 
neighbors and loved ones” is doomed from the “common sense,” folk theory 
of reference expressed by the NAACP, because such new and sympathetic 
uses of the word contradict its inherent meaning, namely, Odious Black.   
Philosophical theories that view meanings as ideas in the mind of the 
word user add further support to N-word abolitionists.  John Locke was an 
early supporter of this common “ideational theory of meaning,”19 
maintaining in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding that “words in their 
primary or immediate signification stand for nothing but the ideas in the 
mind of him that uses them.”20  Hobbes was another early supporter, 
declaring in Leviathan that “the general use of speech, is to transfer our mental 
 
 17 Id. at 167 (“Linguistic expressions get their meaning only via their capacity to correspond, or failure 
to correspond, to the real world or to some possible world; that is, they are capable of referring 
correctly (say, in the case of noun phrases) or of being true or false (in the case of sentences).”).  
 18 See supra note 6.   
 19 WILLIAM P. ALSTON, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE  22 (1964). 
 20 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 225 (A. S. Pringle-Pattison ed.,  
1924) (emphasis omitted). 
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discourse, into verbal; or the train of our thoughts, into a train of words.”21  
From this perspective, meanings are in our heads; they are mental 
happenings within the individual which accompany speaking and 
understanding language.22  For instance, let’s assume that someone explains 
or introduces the N-word to someone else “by ostension,” that is, by pointing 
to the kind of person for which the word stands.  Many words in everyday 
language are taught and learned in just this way—one person explains or 
introduces a word to another by pointing to an entity or process (a chair, 
table, fire, fight) and uttering the word.  Accordingly, someone introduces or 
explains the N-word to another by pointing to an “Odious Black” and 
uttering it.   
How does any later application of the word flow from this act of naming?  
According to supporters of the mental image approach to meaning, after the 
word is introduced in this way, whenever the word comes up again, it will 
call up an image or picture of the “Odious Black” in the mind.  “Having the 
image is what understanding the word amounts to.”23  The same holds for 
future applications of the word:  the image determines its future uses.  By 
enabling us to recognize objects of the right kind to be called by that word, 
the image dictates the use of the word and the use of the word flows from the 
mental image.24  From this standpoint, people only really understand what 
we say if they manage to construct a picture in their heads like ours.  Eminent 
philosophers and psychologists like Bertrand Russell25 and E. B. Titchener26 
have supported this image theory of meaning.  Under this approach, 
“meaning is a mental activity” that occurs inside the heads of private 
individuals, and words are mere public expressions of private thoughts and 
feelings and ideas, mere verbal manifestations of inner psychological states, 
mere reports and descriptions of the speakers subjective mental processes.27  
In the absence of an image or other mental happening within the individual, 
 
21  IAN HACKING, WHY DOES LANGUAGE MATTER TO PHILOSOPHY?, 15 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1975). 
 22 DAVID BLOOR, WITTGENSTEIN: A SOCIAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 6 (Columbia Univ. Press, 
1983).  
 23 Id. at 7. 
 24 Id.  
 25 Id.  
 26 Id. at 8. 
 27 RISHIKANT PANDEY, SPEECH ACT AND LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION 37 (1967). 
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“words are mere counters, capable of meaning, but not at that moment 
possessing it.”28   
If the meaning of the N-word either lies in the mental image of such an 
individual or in some other mental or psychological state that always 
accompanies use of the word, then N-word critics can argue that the word 
indeed does have a fixed and indelible meaning, namely, the image or other 
subjective mental state that always accompanies its use and understanding.29  
From this standpoint an oppressive mentality or consciousness always 
accompanies certain words in ways that make them useless or 
counterproductive as tools for producing real change.  Viewed in this light, 
a speaker or writer does not merely utter the N-word, he or she is uttered by 
it, for the word’s inherent meaning colors the consciousness of all who use it. 
III. FEMINISTS, MARXISTS, FIXED MEANINGS, AND INVASION OF THE BODY 
SNATCHERS 
These “common sense” and philosophical theories of how words work 
cause some of my law students who are dedicated to producing fundamental 
social change to worry about being “indoctrinated,” “brainwashed,” or 
“body snatched” in the process of learning to talk and think like a lawyer (in 
the science fiction classic, Invasion of the Body Snatchers, townspeople are turned 
into their emotionless, characterless doubles by aliens whenever they fall 
asleep).  My students learn early that proper initiation into the law does not 
occur when they have memorized a raft of rules and legal principles, for 
creative courts frequently overturn old rules and principles and create new 
ones.  Instead, they know they have been properly initiated when they can 
translate their experience and that of their client into the legal vocabulary, 
that is, into the lexicon of the law.  But, if a certain outlook, mentality, 
consciousness, or ideology always accompanies certain words, vocabularies, 
lexicons, and discourses, then learning to talk and think like a lawyer may 
mean taking on an alien consciousness or world view—one at odds with the 
values, loyalties, and commitments the student embraced before the first day 
of class. 
 
 28 BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE ANALYSIS OF MIND 201 (George Allen & Unwin 1921).  
 29 Furthermore, if a certain inner psychological state always accompanies the use and understanding 
of certain words and discourses, if such an inner state gives words their meaning, then the mental 
state conjured by the words may encompass more than a single image or picture but also a whole 
ideology or world view, say a bourgeois, false, or racist “consciousness.”  
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Statistics may seem to support their fears, for while roughly 25% of 
incoming law students express an interest in doing public-interest law upon 
graduation, less than 2% of graduates actually do.30  There are many 
explanations for this dramatic difference between what students say they 
want to do before they learn to talk and think like a lawyer and what they 
actually do after they master the legal lexicon (crushing student loans, for 
instance), but still the suspicion lingers for some that learning to talk and think 
like a lawyer can cause a shift in social consciousness and personal 
convictions, say, away from public-interest concerns and toward those of 
corporate America and laissez faire free enterprise.31   
As a first-year student, I shared similar misgivings about the language of 
the law.  The incisive words of Audre Lorde—a thoughtful black feminist 
lesbian poet and social commentator—rang in my ears throughout my first 
year: The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle The Master’s House.32  Because legal 
terms are tools and the legal lexicon is nothing but a toolbox full of words 
like “due process,” “criminal intent,” and “the reasonable person,” I 
construed her warning to be about the inherent limits of the tools of our 
 
 30 See John Bliss, From Idealists to Hired Guns? An Empirical Analysis of “Public Interest Drift” in Law School, 
51 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1973 (2018); see also ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: 
VISIONS OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND 48 (1992) (reporting on a survey finding that 70% of 
incoming Harvard Law School students expressed a preference for public-interest careers, but by 
their third year, only 2% planned to take what the authors defined as public-interest jobs); ROBERT 
V. STOVER, MAKING IT AND BREAKING IT: THE FATE OF PUBLIC INTEREST COMMITMENT 
DURING LAW SCHOOL 3 (1989) (finding that the number of students at the University of Denver 
Sturm College of Law who planned to pursue public-interest careers declined from 33% to 
approximately 17% between the first and third years of law school); Howard S. Erlanger et al., Law 
Student Idealism and Job Choice: Some New Data on an Old Question, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 851, 853–54 
(1996) (finding that over half of the incoming University of Wisconsin law students surveyed were 
interested in jobs with an “explicit social reform component,” but upon graduation only 13% began 
their careers in legal aid, as a public defender, or in a non-profit organization); Craig Kubey, Three 
Years of Adjustment: Where Your Ideals Go, 6 JURIS DR. 34, 34 (1976) (finding that the number of U.C. 
Davis students who reported that a public interest job would be their first choice declined by 15% 
between the first and second years of law school). 
 31 Reinforcing such concerns can be popular depictions of legal education in which, for instance, a 
crusty first-year law professor with a name like “Kingsfield” tells new first-year initiates that his class 
will transform their brains from mush to an organ that can think like a lawyer.  See THE PAPER 
CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox 1973).  Some understandably worry, however: “how much of that 
so-called ‘mush’ is me—my values, viewpoints, convictions, and passions?  Along with my hat, coat, 
and other unnecessary things, how much of ‘me’ do I have to check with the attendant at the coat 
closet on my way to the classroom?” 
 32 AUDRE LORDE, THE MASTER’S TOOLS WILL NEVER DISMANTLE THE MASTER’S HOUSE (1984), 
reprinted in SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 110–14 (2007). 
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trade—the language of the law.  If ‘The Master’s House’ refers to American 
social structures built on the subordination of women and minorities (in other 
words, if this House represents racist patriarchy), it cannot be denied that the 
language of the law, including rights discourse or “rights-talk,” was deployed 
historically to privilege people to rape (a husband had a right to force 
intercourse on an unwilling and resisting woman, for instance, as long as they 
were married), slavery (a slave owner had a right to sell and beat his chattel), 
and Jim Crow (until Loving v. Virginia, my mom and dad did not have the right 
to marry in certain states).  This language of legal rights did function for 
many years as a vital tool in the historical construction and maintenance of 
The Master’s House.  Lorde asks, “[w]hat does it mean when the tools of a 
racist patriarchy are used to examine the fruits of that same patriarchy?”33  
Her answer: “It means that only the most narrow perimeters of change are 
possible and allowable.”34  She concludes that although the Master’s tools 
“may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, they will never 
enable us to bring about genuine change.”35 One reason you cannot 
dismantle the Master’s house (resist his domination) with his own words is 
because those words themselves carry and reproduce his ideology, 
consciousness, mentality, values, outlook, or worldview.  This warning about 
the inherent limits of the tools of our trade, our legal words and definitions, 
if true, is demoralizing to someone seeking to use the language of the law to 
challenge unwarranted privilege backed by precedent and tradition.  
The claim that we can be trapped in a certain way of thinking about and 
looking at the world by our words and their inherent meanings can seem 
commonsensical.   
Take the words used by economists, Freudian psychologists, and 
sociologists and try using them to explain the poverty and crime in South 
Central, Los Angeles, for instance—supply and demand, marginal productivity, 
Pareto efficiency, utility function, and rational utility-maximizing egoist; id, ego, superego, 
projection, repression, psychological trauma, Oedipal complex; social stratification, status, 
roles, group, values, norms, institutions, race.36  It can seem that the very “ideas” 
policymakers can form about poverty and crime will be heavily influenced 
by their language, the words choosing the “ideas” the policymaker can form 
 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id.   
 36 LORDE, supra note 32, at 110–14. 
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rather than the policymaker first forming the “ideas” and then searching for 
the right words to express them.37  These words seem to speak the 
policymaker (that is, direct her attention, channel her perceptions, and shape 
her ideas, consciousness, and outlook) as much as the policymaker speaks the 
words (that is, uses the words to express ideas or represent external reality).  
By the same token, some law students worry that an indelibly corporatist or 
liberal or conservative consciousness, mentality, or outlook may accompany 
talking and thinking like a lawyer.  The legal lexicon brims with old words 
like “rights” and “duties” and “privileges”: are these ancient legal words and 
concepts indissolubly wedded to a certain way of looking at the world?  Is 
legal discourse a lingual trap that cannot bring about lasting change? 
 This is the position taken by Leslie Bender in A Lawyer’s Primer of Feminist 
Theory, where she argues that mainstream legal discourse—that is, “rights-
talk”—in tort law is intrinsically connected to an egoistic male perspective 
and to male values.38  In her words: 
Tort law should begin with a premise of responsibility rather than rights, or 
interconnectedness rather than separation, and a priority of safety rather 
than profit or efficiency.  The masculine voice of rights, autonomy, and 
abstraction has led to a standard that protects efficiency and profit; the 
feminine voice [of caring, context, and interconnectedness] can design a tort 
system that encourages behavior that is caring about others’ safety and 
responsive to others’ needs or hurts, and that attends to human context and 
consequences.39 
Bender’s claim that a certain voice, set of values, and viewpoint always 
accompany the word “rights” exactly parallels the claim that the N-word has 
an inherent meaning.  Professor Bender’s critique of rights-talk as the 
indelible expression of a certain world view or ideology or underlying 
 
 37 It might seem to follow from this view of words and discourse that a speaker or writer does not 
merely utter certain words, he or she is also uttered by them, for their indelibly oppressive meaning 
must negatively influence all who utter or hear them.  It might seem that once words and symbols 
and discourses have been used to establish and maintain oppression, marginalization, and 
subordination, they cannot be used to fight that same oppression, marginalization, and 
subordination.  In sum, it might seem that words with sorry histories can only summon and recycle 
those same sorry meanings, not take on radically new ones capable of producing profound social 
change.  Jody Armour, Nigga Theory: Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity in the Substantive Criminal Law, 12 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9 (2014) (describing how racialized language can be used as a metaphor to 
look at the intersectionality of morality, race, and class). 
 38  Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 31–32 (1988) 
(emphasis added).   
 39 Id. 
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intellectual edifice dates back to Karl Marx’s attack on what the French 
Declaration of 1793 had taken as the fundamental rights of man, namely, the 
rights of liberty, property, security, and equality.  As Marx put it:  
None of the supposed rights of man . . . go beyond the egotistic man . . . that 
is, an individual separated from the community, withdrawn into himself, 
wholly preoccupied with his private interest and acting in 3 with his private 
caprice.40 
For Marx, rights-talk expresses bourgeois ideology, that is, such talk 
reflects the wish of the capitalist entrepreneur to be free from social 
limitations and social accountability—free from any duties of care and 
concern for the well-being of people he exploits.41  For Marx, both in content 
and in form “rights” merely promote and protect the selfish interests of 
acquisitive individuals, and rights-talk merely reproduces an atomistic and 
egoistic world view.42   
In content, the right of liberty, defined as the right to do anything that does 
not harm others, is a right rooted in separation from (rather than solidarity 
with) others.43  My right of liberty gives me a fenced-off area of freedom from 
which I can exclude all others and within which I am privileged to invade 
the interests of others without doing anything the law will call a “harm” or 
“wrong.”44  Through the atomizing lenses of my right to liberty, I look at 
others not as brothers or sisters or friends or neighbors but as limitations on 
my freedom.  Viewing others as limitations on me leads me to feel hostility 
and resentment toward them.  “The right of man to freedom,” says Marx, 
“is not based on the union of man with man, but on the separation of man 
from man.”45  Property rights also erect a fence around each individual: “The 
right of man to property is the right to enjoy his possessions and dispose of 
the same arbitrarily, without regard for other men, independent of society, 
 
 40 KARL MARX, ON THE JEWISH QUESTION (1843), reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 26, 43 
(Robert Tucker ed., 1978) (emphasis added). 
 41  Jeremy Waldron, Karl Marx’s ‘On the Jewish Question,’ in NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, 
BURKE, AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 119, 126 (Jeremy Waldron, ed., Routledge 2015) 
(1987). 
 42  Id. at 126–27. 
 43 Id. at 127. 
 44       Id. 
 45 ERIC R. BOOT, HUMAN DUTIES AND THE LIMITS OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 93 (2017).  He 
notes: “The freedom in question is that of a man treated as an isolated monad and withdrawn into 
himself. . . .  It is the right to this separation, the rights of the limited individual who is limited to 
himself.”  Id. 
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the right of selfishness.”46  The right to equality merely assures that each 
individual enjoys these antisocial rights of personal liberty and private 
property without discrimination, “that each man shall without 
discrimination be treated as a self-sufficient monad.”47  Finally, the right of 
security backs up these other self-regarding, atomistic, and asocial rights with 
guns and badges and “the concept of the police”—it puts the force of the 
state behind social relations and institutions rooted in egoism and so merely 
provides “the assurance of egoism.”48   
In form, rights reflect and reinforce an individualistic ideology by assuming 
that the members of a society are perpetually ready to set at one another’s 
throats and need state-backed, and ultimately police-backed personal rights 
to repel one another (one wields rights as one would a sword and shield to 
fend off or eject trespassers and potential trespassers, those who will 
incessantly seek to encroach upon one’s fenced off area of personal freedom 
and private property).  Finally, the abstract form of rights as neutral rules that 
treat everyone alike hides from view the dominance of haves over have-nots 
and the powerful over the weak.  For instance, legal analyses of the rights and 
duties of people who make promises (the law of contracts) and people who 
injure others (the law of torts) pay no attention to underlying unequal 
distributions of wealth and power in America.  Rather, as Richard Able notes 
in his Marxist critique of Anglo-American tort law, the rightness of those 
unequal distributions is taken for granted and attention focused only on the 
changes in the status quo ante brought about by the accident or broken 
promise.49  So, the abstract form and the bourgeois content of rights-talk 
conspire to make such talk the indelible expression of bourgeois 
individualism.  Rights, in a word, always mean bourgeois rights—their form 
and content rob them of the power to promote unity over hostility, 
community over egoism, and solidarity over separation.  It follows from this 
analysis that rights-talk cannot bring about real progressive social change.  It 
 
 46  Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48  Waldron, supra note 41, at 128 (quoting MARX, supra note 45, at 147). 
 49 See Richard L. Abel, Torts, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 445–70 (David 
Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).  By the same token, feminist and critical race theorists have pointed out 
that tort law reproduces gendered and racialized hierarchies despite its use of seemingly neutral 
rules and procedures.  See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE 
OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010).  Part of learning accident and contract and 
criminal law is learning the general irrelevance to legal liability of gross disparities in wealth and 
power between the parties to the dispute. 
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can only reflect and reinforce bourgeois ideology—bourgeois visions, voices, 
and values.   
So, Feminists and Marxists reject rights-talk on the same fixed-meaning 
grounds that the NAACP critics reject the N-word.  Like critics of rights 
discourse, critics of N-word-laden rap or spoken-word performances contend 
that both in form and content these profane racial utterances, these groupings 
of rule-governed racial epithets, reflect racist beliefs and reinforce a racist 
worldview.  In content, critics suppose that N-word-laden performances have 
an inherently racist “meaning”—such talk is a reflection, however indirect 
and removed, of an underlying anti-black point of view.  And they suppose 
that the profane, abusive, vulgar, and irreverent form of such talk echoes and 
reinforces the disrespect for black personhood in the content.  So, in keeping 
with the implications of the analysis of rights talk, critics of the N-word can 
assert that the profane form and the racist content of N-word-heavy discourse 
conspire to make such talk the indelible expression of racist beliefs and 
attitudes.  Its form and content rob it of the power to promote unity over 
hostility, community over animosity, and solidarity over separation.  
Accordingly, neither rights-talk nor N-word-laden discourse can contribute 
to progressive political discourse. 
Fortunately for those of us professionally or personally committed to 
producing social change through words, symbols, and discourses, including 
hoary old lexicons with sickeningly sexist, racist, and homophobic histories, 
Lorde, Marx, Bender, and the NAACP are right in focusing our attention on 
language as an instrument through which power is exercised.  But they are 
wrong in saying that certain words and discourses are inherently oppressive, 
self-abnegating, atomizing, or socially marginalizing and can only reflect and 
reinforce the status quo.  They are right that there are many lethal discourses 
of domination and exclusion that thwart empathy, stall conscience, and 
preserve privilege, but words do not just link established or “fixed” meanings 
and corresponding references.  Rather, social actors contest the meanings, 
references, and “correct” applications of words in the process of constituting 
their social identity and vindicating their social existence.  What was an 
“incorrect” reference for a word yesterday can, abruptly or by degrees, turn 
into a “correct” reference today as social actors rally in support of a new 
application.  Simply put, any words and symbols can be deployed as political 
tools for any cause; in the realm of political communication and public 
discourse, there are no fixed meanings.  Look at the career of “queer” as a 
word, for instance.  Once a hateful epithet, it now figures in a field of critical 
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theory called “queer theory” that emerged in the early 1990s out of the fields 
of queer studies and women’s studies and includes queer readings of texts 
and critical reflections on “queerness” itself.  Viewing words and symbols and 
discourses as volatile political tools highlights their capacity to be detached 
from their roots and used subversively to generate new meanings, create new 
alliances, and produce profound change. 
IV. A SOCIAL THEORY OF MEANING: WITTGENSTEIN, AUSTIN, AND 
LAKOFF 
The commonsense, fixed-meaning, folk theory of how we use words to 
refer to things in the world highlights the way words can be great devices for 
transmitting factual information.  But in his famous paper, The Meaning of a 
Word, Austin asks, “[w]hy do we call different [kinds of] things by the same 
name?”50  Why do people use the same word for very different “senses?”  For 
instance, why do we use the word “mother” to refer to kinds of mothers—
including birth mothers, donor mother, surrogate mothers, adoptive 
mothers, foster mothers, and step mothers (and mother of invention, mother 
of vinegar, and den mother)—or the word “game” to refer to many different 
kinds of games, some competitive, others not, some that are all luck, others 
that are all skill?  A commonsense, but mistaken explanation would be that 
the kinds of things named by the same word are similar in some way, that 
they share something in common—they form a “classical category”51 on the 
basis of what they all have in common and the name applies to this category.  
 
 50 J.L AUSTIN, J.O URMSON & G.J. WARNOCK, The Meaning of a Word, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 
56, 69 (3d ed. 1979).  
 51 Our everyday folk theory of what it means to belong to a category is that “things are categorized 
together on the basis of what they have in common.”  Accordingly, if my son says, “Dad, there’s a 
duck on our front porch,” I instantly know three things about that creature if my son “correctly” 
referred to it and his statement is “true”—I know the shape of its bill, the length of its legs, and the 
morphology of its feet.  I know this because these shared properties define the category and all 
members share them.  By the same token, if my son says, “Dad, there’s a triangle on our front 
porch,” I may not know the size, color, or texture of that entity, but I know with certainty that it 
has three sides and interior angles adding up to 180 degrees.  I know this because the category 
“triangle,” like the category “duck,” can be viewed as what George Lakoff calls a “classical 
category,” that is, a category defined by the common properties of its members.  LAKOFF, supra 
note 9, at 161 (“Classical Categorization: All the entities that have a given property or collection of 
properties in common form a category. Such properties are necessary and sufficient to define the 
category. All categories are of this kind.”); id. at 8–18 (stating, e.g., “the classical theory that 
categories are sets defined by the common properties of objects,” “Categories are Classical,” “if 
there are common properties, those properties form a classical category, and the name applies to 
 
June 2020] LAW, LANGUAGE, AND POLITICS 1091 
   
 
Austin torpedoed this commonsense view by pointing out that the 
different senses of a word frequently do not have properties in common.52  
To illustrate his point, I will use the word “mother,” for instance.  There is 
no common set of properties shared by all the following kinds of mothers: 
those who give birth, those who donate an egg, those who give birth but did 
not donate the egg, those who lack any genetic or birth connection but who 
are the legal guardian and nurturer, those who lack any genetic or birth 
connection but who are paid by the state to nurture, and those who lack any 
genetic or birth connection but who are current wives of the fathers.  As 
Lakoff says, “[t]he concept mother is not clearly defined, once and for all, in 
terms of common necessary and sufficient conditions.”53  Thus, the word 
“mother” has noncentral extended senses—birth, donor, surrogate, adoptive, 
foster, step—and a central prototypical sense, namely: 
[A person] who is and always has been female, and who gave birth to the 
child, supplied her half of the child’s genes, nurtured the child, is married to 
the father, is one generation older than the child, and is the child’s legal 
guardian.54 
 
this category.”).  For a word to correctly refer to a member of a classical category, the entity referred 
to must be just like every other entity in the category in some relevant way, setting the stage for 
strong inferences and deductions.  What is so attractive about this theory of how we use words to 
refer to different kinds of people, places, and things is that if words have established meanings and 
correct references, they are great devices for transmitting factual information. 
 52 Austin noticed for words the same kinds of things that Wittgenstein noticed for concepts.  
Wittgenstein pointed out that many of our everyday, ordinary conceptual categories, like the 
familiar category game, are not classical since there are no common properties shared by all games—
not all games have competition or winners and losers (e.g., ring-around-the-rosy), not all involve 
more than one person (e.g., solitaire), not all involve luck (chess), not all involve skill (plugging a slot 
machine).  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 31–32 (G. E. M. 
Anscombe trans., 1958).  Instead, what makes game a category, observed Wittgenstein, are the 
“family resemblances” among its members—both basketball and ping pong involve competition, skill 
and athleticism; both basketball and poker involve competition and skill; both poker and solitaire 
involve cards and entertainment; and so on.  Id. at 32 (emphasis added).  Like family members, 
games are similar to one another in lots of different ways.  See id. (noting that “games form a family”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  A little reflection reveals that a great many categories we use 
in everyday and political communication are not classical but constructed and based on family 
resemblances, that is, many (like the category game) are structured around prototypes rather than 
(like the categories duck and triangle) around common properties.  Austin extended this same sort of 
analysis to the study of words themselves and the category of senses that can be named by the same 
word.  The N-word, too, as we will see, has many different senses, and the category of senses named 
by the N-word is not a classical one defined by the common properties of its members but rather it 
is a socially constructed one. 
 53 LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS, supra note 9, at 76. 
 54 Id. at 83. 
 
1092 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:4 
   
 
In this case there are a variety of “principles of extension” from the 
central or prototypical sense to noncentral extended senses—some based on 
giving birth, some on genetics, some on social, cultural, and legal factors.55  
In the end, the mother category, like most other categories in ordinary public 
discourse, is one whose contours and membership depend on social 
conventions rather than shared properties.  And then there is metaphorical 
speech, the mother of all ambiguities and much invention. 
Lakoff calls categories like “mother” radial, as opposed to classical, 
categories.  In his words, “[a] radial structure is one where there is a central 
case and conventionalized variations on it which cannot be predicted by 
general rules.”  A key characteristic of a radial category like mother is that 
the prototype or central case does not and cannot determine which 
subcategories (for instance, which candidates for the “mothers” designation) 
can properly or correctly belong to the category.  As Lakoff notes, “[t]here is 
no general rule for generating kinds of mothers.”56  By the same token, there 
is no general rule for generating kinds of people to whom the N-word can 
refer.  Because the extended senses of the N-word need not share anything 
in common with the prototypical sense of the word, the senses do not form a 
classical category—based on what they all have in common—to which the 
word applies.  Rather, the senses of the N-word are simply culturally and 
politically determined and have to be learned rather than logically deduced.  
In a word, the N-word category is radially structured.  The boundaries of radial 
categories can be extended by social actors in imaginative, creative, and 
unpredictable ways.  The career of a word in political communication and 
public discourse, its developmental arc over time, cannot be logically 
deduced from its origins.  Just as, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
“[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience,” we can say 
the life of ordinary language, too, has been not logic but experience. 57  And 
 
 55 Another way a word develops different senses is through chaining within a category.  “Another case 
is where I call B by the same name as A, because it resembles A, C by the same name because it 
resembles B, D . . . and so on.  But ultimately A and, say, D do not resemble each other in any 
recognizable sense at all.  This is a very common case: and the dangers are obvious when we search 
for something ‘identical’ in all of them!”  AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 72. 
 56 LAKOFF, supra note 9, at 84. 
 57 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).  WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 52, at 
8 (“Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new 
houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of 
new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.”). 
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a major part of the experience that shapes the meaning of language, a major 
mechanism or principle of extension for senses and concepts, is a word’s 
political usefulness in helping unify individuals and create social identities. 
Finally, let me lay to rest the other primary basis for believing that a 
certain oppressive consciousness, mentality, or worldview always 
accompanies certain words and symbols, namely, the theory that meanings 
are in our heads, that they are mental happenings within the individual that 
accompany speaking and understanding language, that they are ideas in the 
mind of the word users, and that “[h]aving the image is what understanding 
the word amounts to”58—in short, let me put to rest the “ideational theory 
of meaning.”59  Wittgenstein emphatically declared that “nothing is more 
wrongheaded than calling meaning a mental activity. 60  Instead, he located 
word meanings outside the heads of speakers—in the function that words 
have as “signals” passed back and forth between people in the course of 
purposeful and shared activity. 61  Wittgenstein coined the term “language-
game” to emphasize “the fact that the speaking of language is part of an 
activity, or of a form of life.”62  One famous language-game he describes 
involves a builder, called A, communicating with his helper, B.63  The game 
nicely illustrates the different ways that words carry meaning or function in 
shared, purposeful activity; it also nicely shows how unnecessary it is to look 
for the meaning of language in “mental pictures” or “subjective thoughts, 
beliefs, intentions” or any other mental activity that accompanies talking and 
understanding.  B’s job is to pass A stones of various kinds—bricks, slabs, 
columns, etc.—when A shouts “brick” or “slab” or “column.”  Words like 
“red” and “blue’ are given a role in the game, so A can shout “red slab,” and 
B will pass slabs of a certain color.  The game could be developed to have 
conventions about word order, so that if A said “slab, column, brick,” this 
means that B is to bring them in a definite order.  Signs that function like 
numerals could be introduced.  B could memorize the alphabet and, when A 
 
 58 BLOOR, supra note 22, at 7. 
 59 WILLIAM P. ALSTON, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 64 (1964). 
 60 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 52, at 171. 
 61 See id. at 72–73 (describing “words” as “signal[s]” of one’s “mental state,” not “a description” 
thereof) (internal quotation marks omitted); BLOOR, supra note 22, at 22 (delineating Wittgenstein’s 
views on “linguistics” within his work Blue and Brown Books).  
 62 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 52, at 11; see also BLOOR, supra note 22, at 22 (describing Wittgenstein’s 
“language-game[s]” as delineated in Blue and Brown Books). 
 63 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 52, at 3–6. 
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shouts “d slabs!,” B could chant the letters a, b, c, d, and bring a slab for each 
letter.  Words that act like proper names (that is, represent unique entities 
rather than kinds of entities)64 could be added to the game.  Thus, there could 
be a mark “H” on the hammer that A uses.  When A shows B the mark, B 
fetches the object marked “H.”  Finally, words like “this” or “there” could 
be used in the course of pointing to things and moving them about.   
This language-game or discourse through which A communicates with B 
is a complete system of communication as far as Builders and Helpers are 
concerned—and each verbal signal has its own function.  For instance, the 
words “slab” and “brick” function in their language-game very differently 
than the words “here” and “there” or “red” and “blue” or the numerical 
signs “a,” “b,” “c,” and “d.”  Put differently, the words “slab” and “brick” 
are different kinds of tools in their shared activity than the words “here” and 
“there.”  As Wittgenstein puts it, “[t]hink of the tools in a tool-box: there is a 
hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, nails and screws.  
The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.”65  
Once we see clearly that different words function differently in mediating a 
shared activity like building something, we also see clearly that words can 
only be understood in terms of how they are woven into those patterns of 
shared activity—we see clearly that they can only be understood in terms of 
the role they play in language games.  “Only in the stream of thought and 
life do words have meaning,” says Wittgenstein.66  The stream of life that 
pulses through a language-game—the shared and purposeful activity that the 
game makes possible—creates meanings or “uses” for the words in the game.  
“For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word 
‘meaning,’” he says, “it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use 
in the language.”67 
Thus, the meaning of the N-word is its use in language, and since its uses 
are many, its meanings are many. 
 
 64 A proper noun or proper name is a noun representing a unique entity (such as London, Jupiter, 
John Hunter, or Toyota), as distinguished from a common noun, which describes a class of entities 
(such as city, planet, person, or corporation). 
 65 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 52, at 6. 
 66 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ZETTEL 31e (G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, ed., Univ. of 
Cal. Press 1967). 
 67 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 52, at 20; BLOOR, supra note 22, at 24.  Most simply, we do not express 
ideas with language, we do things with words—words are social acts with social consequences and 
understanding words is knowing how to do certain things with them. 
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Drawing on this insight that the meaning of a word is its use, I will now 
draw on the work of J. L. Austin to show that one of the most potent uses of 
words in our collective stream of life is as performatives, especially as political 
performatives.  The N-word can be a political performative, the word “rights” 
can be a political performative, indeed, any form of linguistic or nonlinguistic 
symbolic communication can be a political performative.  When old words 
and symbols are used as political performatives, they can take on radical, 
even revolutionary, new meanings.   
V. PERFORMATIVES: VERBAL ACTS WITH SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES  
In his aptly titled book, How to Do Things with Words, J. L. Austin bolsters 
Wittgenstein’s insight that social function, purpose, and use—not a speaker’s 
subjective mental state—determine the meaning of words.  Austin 
distinguishes between “statements” (of fact) and other kinds of sentences that 
look like “statements” but are not at all what they seem.  He calls these 
sentences that look like “statements” (of fact), but play a completely different 
role in our language-games, “performatives.”68  He points out that, for a long 
time, philosophers assumed that a “statement” can only “‘describe’ some 
state of affairs, or to ‘state some fact,’ which it must do either truly or 
falsely.”69  The sentences “it is raining outside” and “George W. Bush was 
the 42nd President of the United States” are clearly “statements” by this 
definition—both utterances state facts and are either true or false.  The 
function of a “statement” is to transmit true or false information about the 
world from one person to another.  But where does this leave words and 
sentences and utterances that neither describe anything nor state a fact, 
common words and sentences like “‘I do” (take this person to be my lawful 
wedded spouse) spoken at a wedding, “I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth” 
spoken when “smashing the bottle against the stem” of a ship, “I give and 
bequeath my watch to my brother” written in a will, and “I bet you [ten 
dollars] it will rain tomorrow.”70  As Austin observes, when I say these words, 
I am not stating, reporting, describing, or asserting facts—I am performing 
acts.  In appropriate circumstances, no matter what mental reservations I feel, 
 
 68 J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 4–6 (Oxford Univ. Press 1962) (reproducing 
the William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955). 
 69 Id. at 1.  
 70 Id. at 4–5. 
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uttering the words “I promise to do or to refrain from doing” or “I do” bind 
me to another person.  And a married man who says the words “with this 
ring I thee wed” to a woman who is not his wife during an official second 
marriage ceremony while still married by those very words becomes a bigamist 
no matter how thoroughly he convinces us that his heart and mind were not 
in his utterance.71  The act of marrying, like the acts of promising, betting, 
and bequeathing (to mention just a very few) must be described as ‘saying 
certain words,’ rather than as performing any mental or psychological action 
“of which these words are merely the outward and audible sign.”72  In the 
 
 71 Id.  Words like “I do” and “with this ring I thee wed” might indeed dwell within me (depend on my 
mental, emotional, or spiritual state) if they simply described or reported what was in my heart or 
mind or spirit as I spoke them.  See id. at 9 (noting, of “performative utterance[s],” that “the outward 
utterance is a description, true or false, of the occurrence of [one’s] inward performance”).  That is, 
if they simply described or reported the occurrence of a mental, emotional, or spiritual act within 
me—an act that either did or did not happen as the words were spoken, making the words “I do” 
either true or false—then their meaning depends on my mental, emotional, or spiritual state.  See 
id. at 10–11 (recognizing situations where one’s “utterance,” or the “promise” made, is “not 
implemented” because it is made without the intention of fulfillment).  From this perspective, I only 
mean what I say when my words accurately reflect my inner thoughts and feelings.  See id. at 9–11 
(describing the role of intentionality as it relates to the binding impact of one’s utterances).  Thus, 
under this approach, the words “I do” are a “statement” (of fact) about a mental, emotional, or 
spiritual act that I perform as I say them.  See id. at 10–11 (delineating the potential effect of 
“performative utterance[s]” on the promises inherent in one’s commitment to marriage).  If I say 
the words outwardly while inwardly refusing to perform the mental or spiritual act, then the words 
“I do” do not accurately describe my mental state as I utter them—in a word they are a lie, a 
misrepresentation of my true inner state.  Id. at 10–11 (illustrating the potential for a promise “given 
in bad faith” or one which will “not be implemented”).  My failure to perform the mental or spiritual 
act as I uttered the verbal formula might then prevent the bond from truly being formed.  But see id. 
at 11 (noting that when one promises something but inwardly does not intend to fulfill his or her 
commitment, the promise “is not . . . void, though it [may be] given in bad faith”).  Accordingly, a 
man could apparently marry two women but challenge a bigamy charge by saying that in the 
second marriage ceremony, when he said “I do,” he was “lying”—as Austin notes, he could say 
that “my tongue swore to, but my heart (or mind or other backstage artiste) did not.”  Id. at 10 
(citing Hippolytus 1.612).  By the same token, I could say “my tongue (or typewriter or ball point 
pen) swore to, but my heart and mind did not” when I uttered (in speech or writing) the words “I 
promise to.”  See id. at 11 (describing that “the person uttering the promise should have a certain 
intention” to be bound by her “word[s]”).  If what truly binds me is my will and not my words, then 
without being bound I could raise my hand to signal a bid at an auction while inwardly thinking 
and feeling “I bid not” or I could say to a Vegas bookie “I bet 100 dollars” while inwardly thinking 
and feeling “I bet not.”  But see id. at 11 (noting that one who makes a “bet” made without the 
intention of honoring such nonetheless promises, at least outwardly, to fulfill such obligation).  It 
may be easier to imagine uttering a verbal formula while thinking and feeling the opposite of what 
the formula says by imagining that you just learned how to say “I bet” in a foreign language, say 
French, and uttered that French phrase while inwardly thinking in English “I bet not.”   
 72 Id. at 13. 
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appropriate circumstances, to marry, promise, bet, or bequeath is simply “to 
say a few words.”73  The meaning of the sentences “I do,” “I promise,” and 
“I bet” lies not in what they say but in what they do—namely, bond and bind 
individuals.  Despite any mental or spiritual reservations we may harbor, 
when we say “I promise” or “I do,” as Austin observes, “our word is our bond.”74  
An utterance like “with this ring I thee wed” does not report or describe the 
fact that we are marrying, it constitutes the act of marrying—the act of 
marrying is largely a verbal act performed by ‘saying certain words.’75  More 
than just words, such utterances are also deeds—they are “verbal acts.”  
Austin calls these “verbal acts” “performative sentence[s],” “performative 
utterances,” or simply “performatives.”76  Calling such words 
“performatives” is apt because they actually perform an action and are “not 
 normally thought of as just saying something.”77   
 
 73 Id. at 7–8. 
 74 Id. at 10. 
 75 Id. at 13. 
 76 Id. at 5–7, 12–13.  Because performatives like “I do-promise-bid-bet-bequeath-and-christen” are 
not “statements” (of fact) about the speaker’s intentions or inner psychic condition, the meaning of 
these performatives does not depend on any hidden happenings in the head of the speaker.  Id. at 
6 (demonstrating that “utterances” as such are “[n]either true [n]or false”).  Rather, the only 
meaning these verbal acts have sits in plain view, residing in the way speakers and listeners use them, 
in the actions users perform with them, and in the ways the performatives function as “signals” 
passed back and forth between people in the course of purposeful and shared activity.  Id. at 6–7 
(describing “performatives” as “the performing of an action . . . not just saying something”).  
Furthermore, the meaning of these performatives, their range of use and application, can be hotly 
contested, as we saw in the same-sex marriage debate, which can be framed as a debate over 
whether utterances like “with this ring I thee wed” can perform the same bonding action for same-
sex couples as it could for straight ones, that is, whether same-sex couples can be included in the 
meaning of marriage. 
 77 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 7 (emphasis added).  Lawyers call performative utterances in 
written instruments the “operative language.”  Id.  Thus, the operative words in a deed conveying 
real property might be “sell” and “convey”—in some states, these are the statutory operative 
“words of conveyance” for property title conveyance.  See generally, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-
20-101 to -209 (2018) (using operative words like conveyance in the state statute on liens for 
personal property).  A deed is not a valid conveyance of real property without these “words of 
conveyance.”  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-10-106 (2018) (explaining that no estate or interest 
in lands can be conveyed without a deed or conveyance in writing).  Words like “sell” and “convey” 
in a document serve to effect the transaction—they perform an action—while all the other words 
(names of parties, description of property, and statement of consideration) merely report facts and 
set the stage.  See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 7 (“[W]hereas the rest of the document merely 
‘recites’ the circumstances in which the transaction is to be effected.”) (footnote omitted).  
  Also, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, performative utterances are treated very differently than 
“statements” and “assertions” (of fact).  The hearsay rule, FED. R. EVID. 802, prohibits the use of 
“statements” (of fact) made outside of court to prove that the facts described or reported in those 
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statements really did happen.  FED. R. EVID. 802; FED. R. EVID. 801.  For instance, suppose a 
prosecutor wants to prove that an accused killer shot the deceased victim.  It would be perfectly 
proper for the State to call, as a witness, Bill, to testify under oath that he was at the scene of the 
crime and observed the accused shoot the victim.  However, it would violate the hearsay rule for 
the State to call, as a witness Jack, to testify that he was not at the scene of the shooting, but Bill 
told him that he (Bill) was at the scene and observed the accused shoot the victim.  To put it in the 
sometimes-cumbersome phrasing of the law, the hearsay rule prohibits the use of an out-of-court 
statement like Bill’s to prove “the truth of the matter asserted” (i.e., that the accused indeed was the 
shooter).  FED. R. EVID. 802.  In other words, Bill’s statement (of fact) to Jack about what he saw, 
like any statement or assertion of fact, is either sincere or insincere.  If Bill was being sincere when 
he made the statement to Jack, his statement tends to prove that the accused did in truth shoot the 
victim (the reason even the most sincere assertions of fact only tend to prove the existence of the facts 
asserted is because honest people make mistakes in perception, memory, and narration all the time).  
But, if Bill was lying about the facts (maybe he was not at the scene or was but did not get a good 
look or got a good look but wants to frame the accused), his statement in no way tends to prove that 
the accused was the shooter—in legal parlance, his assertion (of fact) in no way tends to prove “the 
truth of the matter asserted.”  And the risk that Bill is lying increases if he did not make the statement 
(of fact) under oath and subject to cross-examination.  We want to know that Bill’s statements (of 
fact) honestly express his sound perceptions and memories before we allow Jack to repeat those 
statements in a courtroom as some proof that the accused did “the matter asserted.”  Accordingly, 
assertions of fact like those Bill made to Jack cannot be repeated in court to prove that the accused 
shot the victim, that is, “to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”   
  However, there is absolutely no hearsay problem under the Rules of Evidence with Jack repeating 
the words of Bill in court if Bill’s words were “With this ring I thee wed” rather than “the accused 
shot the victim.”  Other out-of-court words by Bill that Jack can repeat in court without a problem 
include: “I promise,” “I bet,” “I christen,” “I bequeath” or any other performative utterance.  Jack 
can freely repeat and quote these out-of-court utterances in court because Bill’s words are verbal 
acts rather than factual reports or descriptions of reality.  A statement (of fact) like “it is raining 
outside” transmits information about the world that can be true or false and about which the 
speaker could be lying.  But a verbal act like “with this ring I thee wed” does not report the fact 
that we are marrying, it constitutes an act; simply put, the act of marrying is largely a verbal act 
performed by “saying certain words.”  AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 12–13 (emphasis in original).  
By the same token, to say in response “I do” is to consummate a morally and legally significant act.  
Accordingly, unlike “statements” and “assertions” (of fact), verbal acts cannot be true or false—“we 
do not speak of a false bet or a false christening,” for instance.  Id. at 11.  Because the sincerity of 
the speaker of performatives is irrelevant to their binding effect, the sincerity worries that keep out 
“statements” (of fact) as hearsay do not keep out verbal acts.  Of course, if the words “I promise,” 
“I bet,” or “I do” merely describe some inward mental or spiritual action “of which these words 
are merely the outward and audible sign,” they would qualify as “statements” or “assertions” (of 
fact) about the speaker’s inner condition and constitute hearsay.  But the words “with this ring I 
thee wed” are not hearsay because they are not “statements” (of fact) about the speaker’s mental 
state—they may look like statements of fact, but their meaning lies in their social use, not in any 
images, pictures, thoughts, beliefs, ideas, or desires within the speaker that accompany their social 
use.  As Wittgenstein stressed, language-games are a “form of life” in which words are deeds and 
understanding words boils down to knowing how to do things with them.  
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VI. A POLITICAL THEORY OF MEANING  
This brings us to the most important questions of this analysis: what 
makes a performative word or symbol “political” and what social action does 
such political communication perform?  In what sense can words like “rights” 
and the N-word constitute political performatives?  There are two common 
reductive conceptions of politics that obstruct a clear view of the creative role 
performatives play in politics.  The first is that politics is something that 
occurs only in the state.  Given the massive amount of money that goes into 
national, state, and local elections, and the media attention lavished on these 
“horse races,” it is easy to see why many people view politics as a contest that 
happens only in designated places like voting booths, congressional 
chambers, city councils, governors’ mansions, and the White House.78  
Accordingly, dictionaries commonly define politics as “[t]he art or science of 
government or governing, especially the governing of a political entity, such 
as a nation, and the administration and control of its internal and external 
affairs”79 and political science as “the study of the processes, principles, and 
structure of government and of political institutions.”80  Call this the state 
model of politics.  Under this model, politics in contemporary America can 
easily be equated with representative government and a representative 
political system.  “No taxation without representation” qualifies as a 
paradigmatic political slogan under this approach.81   
The second views political activity as a contest over the power to make 
the rules of the game and to determine the distribution of goods and services 
and taxes and jobs—a contest over who gets what, when, and how.82  Call 
this the spoils model of politics (as in “to the victor go the material and 
decisionmaking spoils of victory”).   
But “say it loud, I’m black and I’m proud” cannot qualify as a political 
slogan under the spoils model because it makes no claim on resources or 
 
 78 Jennifer Fitzgerald, What Does “Political” Mean to You?, 35 POL. BEHAV. 453, 462–63 (2013).  In this 
study of ordinary people’s ideas of what “political” means, the highest percentage, 87%, considered 
tax cuts a political issue.  Coupled with the study’s finding that many people think “politics means 
anything related to government bodies,” especially representative ones, for many “no taxation 
without representation” would be readily recognized as a political statement.  Id. at 467.  
 79 Politics, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2011). 
 80 Political Science, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 
2011). 
 81 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 82 HAROLD D. LASSWELL, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF HAROLD D. LASSWELL (1951).   
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decisionmaking authority.  Nor can it qualify as political communication 
under the state model because it does not focus on “[t]he activities or affairs 
engaged in by a government, politician, or political party.”83  It is a political 
performative, but what is its politics?  
To move beyond these narrow state and spoils models of politics, I will start 
with a bare minimum, stripped down definition of politics purely in terms of 
power.  Politics concerns power.  But while power is the point of politics (and 
the object of political theory), power takes many forms.  Anything that can 
produce or resist social change is a form of power, including money, social 
status, tradition, and the barrel of a gun.  Yet in democratic nations, social 
change has been produced, and power has been effectively wielded, by 
unarmed socially marginalized and poor people without tradition on their 
side.  So, there is a kind of power in democracies that can prevail over guns, 
money, and entrenched privilege, and that is the power of numbers—of 
individuals working together as a collective social actor to achieve a common 
project.  Workers movements, the civil rights movement, the women’s 
movement, and a host of successful conservative social movements attest to 
the power of numbers in a democracy to produce (and resist) social change.84   
Numbers alone mean nothing.  Numbers without unity, solidarity, and 
collective identity carry little weight in a democracy.  In a democracy, 
political power consists critically in the formation of the “us” and the “them” 
which make collective social action possible.  So, the most basic political 
question in a democracy is: what forces create commitment, unity, and 
solidarity among individuals?  What factors can unify and bond individuals 
in a democracy?  What forms of communication constitute political forces 
just as much as guns and money and elective offices? Words and other 
communicative symbolism play a decisive role in the process of creating our 
political identities and our contests.  Indeed, words, symbols, and discourses 
play as big a role as a person’s status as an African American, woman, 
immigrant, worker, or business owner. 
 
 83 Politics, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2011). 
 84 Colin Hay, Divided by a Common Language: Political Theory and the Concept of Power, 17 POL. 45 (1997) 
(stating that “[p]ower is probably the most universal and fundamental concept of political analysis,” 
that Terrence Ball describes power as “‘arguably the single most important organizing concept in 
social and political theory,’” and that “[q]uite simply, power is politics, politics is power.”) (internal 
citation omitted). 
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It is common to hear that people form social identities and bond together 
in collective action due to “common interests.”  A social structure that places 
one group of individuals dominant over another—white over black, men 
over women, rich over poor, or any relationship between the dominant and 
the subordinate group—we can call a vertical relationship.  This vertical 
relationship also defines the horizontal relationships among members of each 
group.  Thus, blacks, women, and the poor have “true” or “common 
interests” by dint of their common subordination to whites, men, and the 
rich respectively.85  In other words, the vertical structure of domination and 
subordination creates a corresponding horizontal structure of “common” or 
“objective” or “exogenous” or “true” interests among all those in the same 
social position.  Under the “true” or “common interests” theory of unity 
among individuals, “common interests” give an alliance of individuals a 
collective identity and common consciousness, and, consequently, anyone 
who does not think and act in harmony with his or her “true” or “common 
interests” is self-abnegating and has “false consciousness.”86  
The “common interests” model of bonding, solidarity, and politics is half 
right, since sharing a relation to a structure of social domination or privilege 
provides a vital basis for unity, and since common life experiences, especially 
the shared experience of a common oppression, subordination, or 
exploitation can be an important basis of much political bonding.  But 
common life experiences are far from sufficient bases for bonding and 
solidarity within a group.  The “common interests” model ignores the force 
of words and symbols in the formation and maintenance of people’s social 
and political identities.  Vertical and horizontal relationships do not 
necessarily thrust identities on people; men and women choose their 
individual and collective identities—a physically disabled, African American, 
lesbian senior citizen who is a devout Muslim could choose any of seven 
horizontal relationships as the one most important to her personal and social 
identity.  She could also talk about “intersectionality” and claim all seven 
identities, or she could decline the invitation to claim any of them, defining 
herself instead primarily as an environmentalist or animal rights advocate or 
robust individualist who refuses to define herself in terms of any social 
category or to engage in any unified social action.  Whatever her choice of 
 
 85 By the same token, thanks to their common position in relation to a subordinate group, whites have 
“common interests” in relation to blacks; men have them in relation to women; the rich have them 
in relation to the poor.  
 86 Steven Lukes, In Defense of “False Consciousness,” 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 19, 22–23 (2011). 
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social identities and political projects, it will only very partially be dictated by 
the position she shares with others in the social structure. 
Closer to home, take me: like many people, I am in both dominant and 
subordinate groups.  Vertically, I am in a dominant class and gender but 
subordinate race.  Thus, in my dominant social positions, I have horizontal 
relationships with people in high tax brackets and with men; in my 
subordinate social position, my horizontal relationships are with blacks.  I 
can easily multiply my vertical and horizontal relationships: light skinned vs. 
dark skinned, straight vs. gay, Christian vs. Muslim, able-bodied vs. 
physically disabled, citizen vs. undocumented worker, English speaking vs. 
non-English speaking, mentally healthy vs. mentally ill, and so on.  Include 
intersectionality as an additional irreducible form of domination and 
subordination and there are endless permutations, endless layers of 
horizontal structural relationships on which individuals could base their 
identity and political activity.  Further, once a collective social actor, an “us,” 
comes into existence, there are many centrifugal forces—the many internal 
divisions and conflicting perspectives based on these differences of gender, 
class, religion, and the rest—threatening its unity and cohesion and hence its 
power.87  
Thus, a multiplicity of “us and them” divisions is possible in any society.  
“Not every possible interest group is an organized interest group and not every 
organized interest group earns or keeps the loyalty and commitment of all its 
potential members.  Thus, collective social actors or collective social 
identities are the outcome of social struggles over identity and community, 
not the expression of social structures.88 
VII. POLITICAL PERFORMATIVES 
Individuals use political performatives to create and transform 
communities and to establish individual and collective identities.  Most 
 
 87 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 17 (1997).  I discuss this issue in great detail 
in another piece.  See Jody Armour, Nigga Theory: Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity in the Substantive 
Criminal Law, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 12–13 (2014). 
 88 Therefore, the “common interests” approach to politics and collective action is incomplete.  It 
ignores questions of how social actors choose from an often vast menu of possibilities any particular 
horizontal structural relationship, or set of such relationships, by which to define themselves.  It 
ignores, in other words, questions of how people forge and maintain bonds with others in any given 
horizontal structural relationship—how they create individual and collective identities.  
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simply, political performatives are words, symbols, and discourses that 
perform the social action of bonding and unifying individuals into collective 
social actors, the ultimate source of power in a democracy.  Political 
performatives are tools89—linguistic and nonlinguistic forms of symbolic 
communication—people use to forge the unities that make collective action 
possible.  Political performatives acquire their force through their ability to 
unite people in action.90  
Words like “I pledge allegiance” epitomize linguistic bonding 
performatives, which in a democracy like ours may create multiple 
affiliations because individuals may pledge loyalty to multiple (sometimes 
even competing) groups.  The same words in the context of a cult of 
personality in totalitarian states would leave much less room for the creation 
of multiple political identities. 
Examples of nonlinguistic political performatives that perform the same 
social bonding action as pledges of allegiance include American and 
Confederate flags, personifications (Uncle Sam), monuments (Mount 
Rushmore, the Statue of Liberty, Confederate memorials), melodies (purely 
instrumental versions of the Star Spangled Banner, America the Beautiful, 
Dixie), and even follicle fashion. 
Unabashedly nappy and self-affirming, big Afros in my youth represented 
the gravity-defying antithesis of the wind-flapping-in-your-hair white 
standard of beauty by which many black people’s full lips, broad noses, kinky 
hair, and dark skin were deemed inherently ugly.91  Many world cultures 
shared this negative view of natural black features, and many black 
Americans internalized Euro-centric beauty standards, frequently referring 
to straight hair as good and their own naturally nappy variety as bad—fit only 
for lye and presses and weaves and relaxers.  Thus, those who donned big 
naturals took so-called bad hair and contested its negative social meaning, 
 
 89 See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 52, at 6 (“Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, 
a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws.—The functions of words are as 
diverse as the functions of these objects.”); see also id. at 20 (“[T]he meaning of a word is its use in 
the language.”). 
 90 Austin identifies a performative as a type of speech act that has a “force” (what he calls an 
illocutionary force) rather than a traditionally conceived “meaning” in the sense in which meaning 
is equivalent to sense and reference.  AUSTIN, supra note 68, at 100. 
 91 Andre-Naquian Wheeler, The Radical Politics Behind Afros, VICE: I-D (July 7, 2017, 5:50 PM), 
https://i-d.vice.com/en_us/article/zmn454/the-radical-politics-behind-afros; Chime Edwards, 
The Impact of the Fro in the Civil Rights Movement, ESSENCE (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.essence.com/
holidays/black-history-month/impact-fro-civil-rights-movement/. 
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inverting and transvaluing nappyness into a sensuous nonlinguistic form of 
discursive bonding exactly equivalent to linguistic ones like Black is Beautiful 
and Say it loud, I’m black and I’m proud.  Both the Afros and the slogans were 
forceful bonding performatives used by black people in the mid-to-late 1960’s 
to create alliances of loyal and committed individuals capable of producing 
social change through unified social action.  Accordingly, Black Power 
proponents of that era routinely uttered big Afros as part of their oppositional 
political discourse, including members of the Black Panther Party and iconic 
political activist Angela Davis.   
Black power proponents who donned afros and used follicle fashions to 
protest undemocratic subordination were far from the first “radical” 
Americans to use the symbolic bonding power of fashion to fight illegitimate 
assertions of power.  That honor and distinction goes to the very first 
postcolonial Americans (or proto-Americans, if you will), namely, the 
revolutionary Philadelphia militiamen, who in the mid-1770s resisted putting 
on conventional uniforms, preferring instead hunting shirts, which they said 
would “level all distinctions []” within the militia.92  In so doing, they were 
both struggling over the meaning of symbolic communication and using the 
symbolic force of fashion to bond together.93  This American political 
tradition of using the bonding force of fashion to rally resistance to 
illegitimate assertions of power recently produced another forceful 
nonlinguistic performative—namely, the hoodie.  This article of clothing was 
worn by black 17-year-old Trayvon Martin on the occasion of his fatal 
shooting by neighborhood watchman George Zimmerman, who claimed to 
reasonably believe that Martin posed an immediate threat of death, serious 
bodily injury, or “forcible felony.”94  After the killing, students, pundits, and 
 
 92 GREGORY T. KNOUFF, SOLDIERS’ REVOLUTION: PENNSYLVANIANS IN ARMS AND THE FORGING 
OF EARLY AMERICAN IDENTITY 38 (2004).  It is very possible that pre-colonial Native Americans 
also used fashion to fight illegitimate assertions of power. 
 93 See ERIC FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 66 (2005) (explaining that the 
demand for cheaper uniforms, like the hunting shirt, derived from class differences and sought to 
neutralize distinctions within the militia).  
 94 Linton Weeks, Tragedy Gives The Hoodie A Whole New Meaning, NPR (Mar. 24, 2012, 5:44 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2012/03/24/149245834/tragedy-gives-the-hoodie-a-whole-new-meaning; 
Katherine Boyle, Trayvon Martin’s Death Has Put a Spotlight on Perceptions About Hoodies, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 25, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/trayvon-martins-death-has-put-
spotlight-on-perceptions-about-hoodies/2012/03/24/gIQAwQ6gaS_story.html; Elizabeth Flock, 
Trayvon Martin ‘Million Hoodie March’: A Short History of the Hoodie, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2012), 
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politicians donned hoodies to stand in solidarity with victims of racial 
profiling and to bond with others who saw a miscarriage of justice in the 
failure of police to properly investigate the shooting or charge Zimmerman.95 
The Confederate battle flag controversy ignited by the Emanuel Nine 
murders illustrates the performative role of flags in creating and transforming 
communities.96  The “us” the American flag originally stood for did not 
include blacks, who, according to the Supreme Court’s 1857 Dred Scott 
decision, could never become citizens of the United States and “had no rights 
which the white man was bound to respect.”97  The “us” and “them” of the 
American flag before the Civil War was the same “us” and “them” of the 
original Confederate flag: no Confederate flag was necessary before that war 
because the Stars and Stripes already stood for an “us” of white American 
citizens and a “them” of black noncitizens and chattel slaves.  It took 600,000 
dead men in a cataclysmic race war to transform the American flag into an 
emblem that includes black folk in its “us” of American citizens. 
It took another struggle—the Civil Rights Movement—to make the “us” 
of the American flag still more racially inclusive.  After the Supreme Court’s 
1896  Plessy v. Ferguson decision, which made separate-but-equal the law of 
the land,98 the American flag stood for a racially segregated “us,” especially 
for pro-Jim Crow Americans; the flag stood for an “us” of white first-class 
American citizens and a “them” of black second-class citizens.  In the 1950s 
and 60s, many American citizens embraced the Confederate battle flag in 




 95 See, e.g., Eyder Peralta, ‘Million Hoodie March’ Planned in New York to Protest Killing of Trayvon Martin, 
NPR: THE TWO-WAY (Mar. 21, 2012, 5:34 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2012/03/21/149092286/million-hoodie-march-planned-in-new-york-to-protest-killing-of-tr
ayvon-martin (“As part of the campaign, organizers have also asked people to upload pictures of 
themselves wearing hoodies.”).  
 96 See, e.g., Phil Helsel, Mitt Romney Joins Call for Confederate Flag to Come Down After Shooting, NBC NEWS 
(June 20, 2015, 10:05 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/confederate-flag-furor/romney-
joins-call-confederate-flag-come-down-after-shooting-n379161 (discussing the response from 
politicians after the Charleston shooting which was motivated by racial animus and reporting that 
the perpetrator of the murders had posted images of himself online holding the Confederate flag).  
 97 Scott v. Sanford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856). 
 98 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (holding that the “enforced separation of . . . races” 
did not violate the Constitution). 
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“them.”99   Legislative decisions during these years to feature the battle flag 
in the redesign of state flags across the South appear, at least in part, to be 
responses to SCOTUS desegregation decisions like Brown v. Board of Education 
(1954) and other federal pressures to desegregate.  Before the Civil War there 
was no need for a separate Confederate flag to stand for slavery—because 
the American flag itself already stood for that.  Likewise, before the Civil 
Rights Movement there was no need for a separate Confederate flag to stand 
for segregation—because Old Glory itself already stood for that.  At two 
crucial turning points in the history of American race relations, as citizens 
and lawmakers sought to expand the “us” represented by the American flag 
to be more racially inclusive, other citizens and lawmakers rallied around 
some version of the Confederate flag in support of a narrower, more 
exclusive “us.” 
Many groups and individuals fly the American and Confederate battle 
flag together, as if they do not stand for competing conceptions of “us.”  One 
can contend that the two flags do not stand for contradictory conceptions of 
“us” if he or she can show that the battle flag can mean something other than 
support for segregation or white supremacy—something such as, say, 
Southern pride.  A 2013 YouGov poll found that while more Americans 
overall saw the battle flag as a symbol of Southern pride than of racism, many 
more Democrats than Republicans and many more blacks than whites 
viewed it as a symbol of racism.100  Confederate battle flag critics use the 
symbol to isolate a “them” of segregationists and white supremacists and to 
mobilize a racially liberal and inclusive “us.”  Many battle flag supporters say 
they use the same symbol to distinguish an “us” of folk with Southern pride 
from a “them” of folk without.  Some other battle flag supporters, such as the 
KKK, use the emblem to isolate a “them” of inferior blacks and to mobilize 
a racially illiberal and exclusionary “us.”101  Because no words or symbols 
 
 99 See, e.g., Becky Little, Why the Confederate Flag Made a 20th Century Comeback, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (June 26, 2015), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2015/06/150626-co
nfederate-flag-civil-rights-movement-war-history/ (explaining that the Confederate flag began 
reappearing in the 1950s, as the Civil Rights Movement gained popularity and momentum). 
 100 Katie Jagel, Southern Pride or Symbol of Racism?, YOUGOV (Oct. 17, 2013, 10:36 AM), 
https://today.yougov.com/topics/lifestyle/articles-reports/2013/10/17/confederate-flag.  
 101 See id.; Peter Moore, Most Americans, North and South, Disapprove of Flying the Confederate Flag, YOUGOV 
(June 25, 2015, 3:57 PM), https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2015/06/
25/most-americans-disapprove-confederate-flag; Linley Sanders, What the Confederate Flag Means in 
America Today, YOUGOV (Jan. 13, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/
articles-reports/2020/01/13/what-confederate-flag-means-america-today.  
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have indelible meanings, many different claims can be made about the battle 
flag’s meaning.  These conflicting claims set the stage for today’s impassioned 
political struggle over the Confederate flag, whose meaning is not inherent 
or fixed and frozen but rather is a prize in a pitched conflict among groups 
attempting to describe their social reality, constitute their social identity, and 
vindicate their social existence.102 
So, rather than social groups being produced by their “common 
interests,” social actors produce themselves through their political 
performatives—their flags, anthems, monuments, books, plays, movies, 
marches, protests, and parades.  Our political communication does not just 
reflect “our interests,” it creates “our interests”; it does not just reflect who 
we are, it creates “us.”  Races, ethnicities, genders, classes, ages, workers, and 
LGBT persons, as collective social actors with collective social identities, are 
produced by these forms of political communication.  Our sense of common 
interests reflects the successful deployment of political performatives.  That 
words like African Americans, Muslims, women, and LGBT can evoke a 
sense of community, loyalty, and commitment to a common purpose reflects 
generations of social conflict over words and meanings and discourses that 
identify a common position in a social structure. 
Like a flag, the word “right” often functions as a political performative, a 
way of distinguishing between “us” and “them” and unifying “us” in social 
action.  Rights discourse does not reflect an atomistic worldview or any other 
underlying intellectual edifice.  While it cannot be denied that the discourse 
of rights has been (and is still being) used to legitimate social and economic 
inequality,103 major advancements for racial minorities, women, same-sex 
 
 102 See Katie Jagel, Southern Pride or Symbol of Racism?, YOUGOV (Oct. 17, 2013, 10:36 AM), 
https://today.yougov.com/topics/lifestyle/articles-reports/2013/10/17/confederate-flag; Peter 
Moore, Most Americans, North and South, Disapprove of Flying the Confederate Flag, YOUGOV (June 25, 
2015, 3:57 PM), https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2015/06/25/most-
americans-disapprove-confederate-flag; Linley Sanders, What the Confederate Flag Means in America 
Today, YOUGOV (Jan. 13, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-rep
orts/2020/01/13/what-confederate-flag-means-america-today; see also Radley Balcko, We Should 
Treat Confederate Monuments the Way Moscow and Budapest Have Treated Communist Statues, WASH. POST 
(June 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/06/26/we-should
-treat-confederate-monuments-the-way-moscow-and-budapest-have-treated-communist-statutes/; 
Jessica Taylor, The Complicated Political History of the Confederate Flag, NPR (June 22, 
2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/06/22/416548613/the-complicated-pol
itical-history-of-the-confederate-flag. 
 103 Slave owners had property rights in black bodies.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.  Hotel owners 
had a right to refuse service to blacks under Jim Crow.  A. K. Sandoval-Strausz, Travelers, Strangers, 
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couples, and workers104 have come out of social struggles over “rights.”  
Calling a liberty or social interest a “right” enhances the ability of social 
actors to label illegitimate assertions of power and thereby to pinpoint and 
arraign a “them” and rally a democratic “us.”  Uttering the word “right” can 
serve the same purpose as unfurling a flag—it helps bond individuals and, by 
shining a light on unwarranted privilege, provides a framework for group 
demands.  The discourse of rights is simply a mechanism for the formation 
of group action and its force lies entirely in its ability to unite people in action. 
My dad, for instance, captured in the Warden’s own law books the very 
verbal weapons he successfully wielded against the Governor and State of 
Ohio.  After teaching himself the vocabularies of constitutional law and 
criminal procedure, he wielded “bourgeois” rights-talk—old words like 
habeas corpus and due process—against the State of Ohio, fiercely 
contesting the meaning of these words with prosecutors and Attorneys 
General in writs and oral arguments before state and federal tribunals until 
finally he won his appeal in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of 
Armour v. Salisbury.105  The district attorney whose misconduct provided the 
basis for his appeal did not retry him and he was fond of saying from that 
day forward that he “found the key to the jailhouse door in the Warden’s 
own law books” and “made his frozen circumstances dance by playing to 
them their own melody.” 
Thinking about “rights” or any other bit of language in terms of fixed 
inherent meanings asserted by feminist legal theorists like Professor Bender 
trivializes the creative role of words in political communication and the 
creative power of any words to acquire and create new meanings.  In political 
battles, just as the howitzers, cannons, missile launchers and other artillery 
captured from the enemy in a revolutionary war can be among the most 
powerful weapons in the arsenal of freedom fighters, the words of oppressors 
can be among the most powerful weapons in the legal and political 
vocabulary of people resisting oppression.  Because words lack fixed, 
 
and Jim Crow: Law, Public Accommodations, and Civil Rights in America, 23 L. & HIST. REV. 53, 77 (2005).  
Today, payday lenders have a right to charge interest rates that shock the conscience of many.  See 
Bill Fay, Payday Lenders and Loans, DEBT, https://www.debt.org/credit/payday-lenders/ (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2020).  
 104 See ERIC HOBSBAWM, WORKERS: WORLDS OF LABOR 309 (1984) (“There is absolutely no doubt 
that the poor, the working people and the potential or actual members of labour movements spoke 
the language of rights (and still do) . . . .”) (emphasis in original).  
 105 492 F.2d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 1974). 
 
June 2020] LAW, LANGUAGE, AND POLITICS 1109 
   
 
essential, true, real, or inherent meanings, 106 words are weapons that can be 
captured from and turned against adversaries.  This logic applies to rights 
discourse as surely as it does to all words and symbols in ordinary language 
and political communication.  
Which brings us at last to the word many view as the linguistic equivalent 
of the Confederate battle flag and epitome of hate speech, namely, the N-
word.  Historically, and still to this very day, both the N-word and the battle 
flag did (and still do) in some settings performs the social action of 
distinguishing and distancing an inferior black “them” from a superior white 
“us”—and in this role it is one of the most violent and blood-soaked verbal 
acts in the English language.  Blacks, too, sometimes deploy the N-word 
against other blacks as an act of “lateral denigration,” as in black comedian 
Chris Rock’s notorious “I love Black People, but I hate n*gg*s!” put down, 
where lovable “Black People” means respectable blacks and “n*gg*s” means 
contemptible ones.107  But unlike the Confederate battle flag, which generally 
has not been appropriated by African Americans as part of their public 
discourse, the N-word—as the NAACP N-word eulogy pointed out—has 
also been adopted by black writers, artists, entertainers, and ordinary citizens 
and put to a variety of positive uses.108  For instance, some politically engaged 
black rappers like Kendrick Lamar, Earl Sweatshirt, Tupac Shakur, 109 Nas, 
 
 106 To briefly recapitulate the social theory of meaning we have drawn from the work of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, and George Lakoff: Meaning does not determine use, use determines 
meaning—meaning is created by acts of use.  BLOOR, supra note 22, at 25.  Political performatives 
are just one illustration of this larger lingual truth.  Because use determines meaning, and because 
uses change as people’s purposes, needs, and circumstances change, the established or “inherent” 
meaning of a word does not determine its future uses and applications.  Except in technical, 
scientific settings, word meanings are never fixed and frozen.  See LAKOFF, supra note 9, at xi 
(comparing competing views on meaning within cognitive science and explaining that, even in 
scientific settings under the “new view,” word meanings are mutable).  
 107 Chris Rock: Bring the Pain (HBO television broadcast June 1, 1996). 
 108 See Obituary for the N-Word, supra note 7. 
 109 For instance, reviled and revered rapper Tupac Shakur bonded with black criminals by expressly 
linking “brothers,” “n*gg*s,” and “criminal gangstas” or “G”s in the following hook to his solidarity 
dirge, Life Goes On:  
  “How many brothers fell victim to the streets? 
  Rest in peace, young nigga, there’s a heaven for a G 
  Be a lie if told you that I never thought of death 
  My nigga, we the last ones left . . . .” 
  2PAC, LIFE GOES ON (Death Row Records 2001) (1996) (emphasis added).  That is, some use the 
N-word to establish an “us” of folk socially denigrated by non-blacks but who nonetheless love each 
other dearly. 
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Ice Cube, and Jay-Z use the N-word as a political performative to bond with 
the very same black criminals Rock used it to push away from.  Other black 
poets (see, for instance, National Poetry Slam Champion Saul Williams’ 
poem “Sha-Clack-Clack”) and writers frequently use the N-word as a general 
term of solidarity and fellowship.110  And in my sphere of social activity, legal 
scholarship, I have used the N-word to distinguish between an “us” of blacks 
who stand in solidarity with black criminals while seeking to promote 
reconciliation, restoration, and redemption in criminal matters and a “them” 
of people who are chary of sympathy for black criminals and who seek to 
“otherize” them in matters of blame and punishment.111  Deploying the N-
word in certain settings can serve the same purpose as unfurling a flag—it 
can help bond individuals and, by shining a light on unwarranted privilege 
or unjust subordination, provide a vehicle for social solidarity and framework 
for group demands.  In its N-word eulogy, the NAACP found such positive 
applications of the word just as objectionable as the negative ones because of 
the word’s negative (“Odious Back”) inherent meaning.112  Thanks to our 
earlier discussion, we can now plainly explain to NAACP N-word eulogists 
and lingual fundamentalists why their fixed-meaning anti-N-word argument, 
though steeped in “common sense” and supported by respected philosophers 
and progressive writers, misses the point.  The meaning of the N-word is 
simply its different uses in overlapping spheres of social activity.113  They are 
right about the N-word, and so are we. 
 
 110 SAUL WILLIAMS, Sha-Clack-Clack, on SLAM: THE SOUNDTRACK (Epic Records 1998), available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ojDKI8JxfLs.  
 111 Jody Armour, Nigga Theory: Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity in the Substantive Criminal Law, 12 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 9, 9 n.3 (2014).  In certain settings the word enhances my capacity to label a particular 
kind and source of injustice (namely, unwarranted attempts to otherize and morally condemn black 
criminals), and thereby to isolate a punitive eye-for-an-eye “them” and to mobilize a less punitive 
and less retributive “us.” 
 112 See Obituary for the N-Word, supra note 7. 
 113 The value of the N-word as a political performative, as a mechanism for the formation of group 
action, depends entirely on its ability to unify and bond social actors—performatives are effective 
or ineffective, forceful or weak, not true or false.  The N-word has proven to be an extremely forceful 
political performative defined by its various uses in a series of overlapping discursive language 
games; the content of the N-word is simply the constellation of uses to which it is regularly put. 
Recall Wittgenstein’s instruction to “[t]hink of the tools in a tool-box.”  WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 
52, at 6, 20.  In terms of this metaphor, in some of its uses the N-word functions as a saw and axe 
that splits and divides, in other uses it functions as a glue pot and clamp for bonding individuals 
together, in still other uses it may function more like a flashlight that focuses attention on 
unwarranted moral judgments.  “The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these 
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Whether the social and political utility of a given use or application of a 
word or symbol outweighs its social and political costs can always be debated 
for any word or symbol.  I happen to think the N-word’s political utility 
(especially in the hands of thoughtful black poets and writers and performers) 
outweighs its social disutility at this time, but in any case, the issue of whether 
one form of symbolic communication or another should be used in political 
communication can never be resolved simply by appeals to fixed or inherent 
meanings. 
CONCLUSION 
“These are the times that try men’s souls,” begins Thomas Paine’s first 
Crisis paper, part of a searing pamphlet series that helped spark the 
American Revolution.114 Although the flame of revolutionary resistance was 
already alive when Paine’s pamphlets hit the streets of Philadelphia in 1776, 
many historians contend that his work “unified dissenting voices and 
persuaded patriots that the American Revolution was not only necessary, but 
an epochal step in world history.”115  John Adams said: “Without the pen of 
[Paine], the sword of Washington would have been raised in vain.”116 As 
historian Eric Foner rightly notes, Paine’s mastery of the political art forges 
political identities through transforming the meanings of words: 
One of the keys to social change is change in the nature of language itself, 
both in the emergence of new words and in old words taking on new 
meanings. …[Thomas] Paine helped to transform the meaning of the key 
words of political discourse…[Paine helped] to promote revolution by 
changing the very terms in which people thought about politics and 
society.117 
A core thesis of this article has been that, because they have no intrinsic 
connection to any ideas, beliefs, or attitudes, words, like tools, may be 
borrowed or stolen.  Indeed, like weapons in a revolutionary war, some of 
the most effective words are captured from and turned against adversaries. 
 
objects[] . . . [and] the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”  Id.  And this foundational 
insight applies with equal force to all forms of symbolic communication. 
114  THOMAS PAINE, The Crisis, in 1 POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 75, 75 (George H. 
Evans ed., 1839).   
115  PAINE, COMMON SENSE (PAPERBACK), POLITICS AND PROSE, https://www.politics-prose.com/
book/9781434101655 (last visited June 29, 2020). 
116       Jill Lepore, The Sharpened Quill, NEW YORKER (Oct. 9, 2006), https://www.newyorker.com/magaz
ine/2006/10/16/the-sharpened-quill.  
117  Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America, xv, xvii (Oxford University Press, 1976). 
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And this logic applies to every word and symbol in ordinary language and 
political communication—to make history, men and women must often 
make and remake language.  
 
 
